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WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS UNDER RULE 32(d)
IN 1953, eighty-three percent of federal criminal convictions resulted from
guilty pleas. 1 The defendants in this great number of cases waived their
right to a trial, with all its procedural safeguards. 2 The prevalence and the con-
sequences of the guilty plea highlight the significance of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(d),3 under which a trial court may, in its discretion,
permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea and obtain a trial.4 District
1. Of 33,473 convictions in 1953, 31,336 were the result of pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 184, 186 (1953); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST
To APPEAL 297-300 (1947). Pleas of nolo contendere are admissions of the facts alleged
in the indictment for the purposes of the case. United States v. Cosentino, 191 F.2d 574
(7th Cir. 1951) ; Harris v. United States, 190 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1951). But they have no
effect as admissions in any subsequent case. United States v. One Chevrolet Stylemaster
Sedan, 91 F. Supp. 272 (D.C. Colo. 1950). But see United States v. Weirton Steel Co.,
62 F. Supp. 961, 962 (N.D. W. Va. 1945) (dictum) (nolo contendere does not admit
allegations of charge but merely means defendant does not choose to defend).
2. For a much cited judicial statement of these effects of the plea, see Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). See also Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d
559 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 949 (1951) (no issue for jury after guilty
plea); Godish v. United States, 182 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1950) (waiver of trial on the
merits) ; United States v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986
(1950) (waiver of rights against illegal search and seizure and coerced confession);
Berg v. United States, 176 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 876 (1949)
(waiver of jury trial and double jeopardy; prosecution relieved of burden of proof).
3. FEa. R. Caum. P. 32(d) :
"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made
only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."
4. For cases holding that withdrawal is at the discretion of the trial court, see, e.g.,
Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926
(1953) ; Williams v. United States, 192 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v. Harris,
160 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1947). Rule 32(d) has been held not to grant defendants the
absolute right to withdraw guilty pleas before sentence, despite the wording of the rule
which seems naturally to lead to such an inference. United States v. Goo, 10 F.R.D.
337 (D. Hawaii 1950), aft'd, 187 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951).
Apparently the courts require a showing of the same grounds for withdrawal whether
the motion is made before or after sentence. Ibid. Courts, in determining whether there
exists "manifest injustice" allowing withdrawal after sentence, cite as precedent cases
deciding motions made both before and after sentencing. See, e.g., United States v.
Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 46 (1954) ; Williams v. United
States, supra; United States v. Searle, 180 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1950).
Other means of nullifying an invalid guilty plea are a motion to set aside or vacate
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a writ of habeas corpus, and a writ of error corain
nobis. Under § 2255 the movant may be discharged, have a new trial, or be given a cor-
rected sentence; but § 2255, like habeas corpus, requires a showing of lack of jurisdiction
or denial of due process. The writ of error coram nobis is available in federal courts
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court opinions indicate the criteria trial courts generally apply in passing on
motions to withdraw. Moreover, a trial court's grant or denial of such a
motion is reviewable for abuse of discretion,5 and numerous appellate court
decisions delineate the scope of that discretion.
The disposition of withdrawal motions generally depends upon the view
the court takes of the factors which caused the accused to enter the plea.0
All courts have accepted as axiomatic the rule that a guilty plea must be
given freely and with understanding of the crime charged. 7 The reasons are
on similar grounds, but is not limited to persons in custody. Circumstances which are
grounds for a 32(d) withdrawal need not constitute denial of due process. For cases
indicating the relation between 32(d), habeas corpus, and § 2255, see United States v.
Parrino, 203 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1953) (motion insufficient under § 2255 but might qualify
under 32(d)) ; United States v. Shailer, 202 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1953) (§2255 motion
considered also under 32(d)); White v. United States, 190 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1951)
(insufficient application for habeas corpus treated as motion under 32(d)); United States
v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342, 347 (3d Cir. 1950) (concurring opinion) (claim denied under
§ 2255 should be made as 32(d) motion), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 913 (1951) ; but see United
States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951) (32(d) withdrawal denied but case remanded
for reduction of sentence under § 2255).
For withdrawal as effecting trial on the merits, see United States v. Lias, 173 F.2d
685, 687 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Shneer, 105 F. Supp. 883, 886 (E.D. Pa.
1951).
5. United States v. Shneer, 194 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Williams v. United States,
192 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Colonna, 142 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1944);
Camarota v. United States, 2 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1924).
6. For a statement of this general rule, see, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 213 F.2d
230, 232 (7th Cir. 1954); Williams v. United States, 192 F2d 39, 40 (5th Cir. 1951);
Rachel v. United States, 61 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1932).
Probable guilt or innocence of the accused has generally been held not to be an issue
on motion for withdrawal Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927); United
States v. Marcus, supra; Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 194S); United
States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 74 F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Ohio 1947). Contra, Cantwell
v. United States, 163 F.2d 782 (4th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Crawford, 52 F. Supp.
843, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1943); United States v. Shailer, 202 F.2d 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1953)
(dictum). However, failure at least to allege innocence in motion for withdrawal has
been grounds for denial. United States v. Paglia, 190 F2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951) ; United
States v. Norstrand Corp., 168 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1948). See also 61 HAnv. L Ruv.
888 (1948) ; 32 J. Ctan. LAW 199, 201 (1941).
7. United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Friedman Y. United States,
200 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1953); Williams v. United
States, 192 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1951).
See FED. R. CRmI. P. 11:
"The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall nut accept the plea with-
out first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge."
Rule 11 is declarative of the common law. Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d 97, 98
(4th Cir. 1929). See also 2 HAI xNs, PLEAS OF TE CRown c. 31, §2: "And where
a person upon his arraignment actually confesses himself guilty, or unadvisedly discloses
the special manner of the fact, supposing that it doth not amount to felony, where it
doth, yet the Judges, upon probable circumstances, that such confession may proceed
from fear, menace, or duress, or from weakmess or ignorance, may refuse to recurd such
confession, and suffer the party to plead not guilty'."
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obvious and stem primarily from the fundamental policy of protecting the
innocent defendant.8 If the guilty plea results from coercion, its effective-
ness as an instrument for attaining truth is severely limited.0 And misappre-
hension as to the criminal acts charged may lead a defendant to plead guilty
when he is actually responsible only for different acts, which may be either
less culpable or entirely innocent. 10
Certain administrative and judicial practices have been established to insure
that guilty pleas are freely and understandingly given. For example, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation prohibits its agents from employing violence
in dealing with defendants." Before pleading, defendants in all federal crimi-
nal cases must be advised that they may be represented by counsel and, if
they are indigent, that they may have counsel appointed for them.12 Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 10 requires that the accused be given a copy of
the indictment.' 8 And Rule 11 enjoins judges not to accept a guilty plea
without having reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant understands
the charge. 14
8. The same rationalization is used in the analogous situation of coerced confessions.
See 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 822-35 (3d ed. 1940).
9. See WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 824-35 (3d ed. 1940). And it is a violation of due
process of law within the meaning of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. E.g.,
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941);
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1945)
(dictum) ; Behrens v. Hironimus, 166 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1948).
10. See Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) ; Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d
181. (8th Cir. 1944) ; State v. Maresca, 85 Conn. 509, 83 At. 635 (1912).
11. See FLoHmERY, INSIDE THE F.B.I. 92 (1943).
12. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI; FED. R. Cium. P. 44. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945). In passing on motions for with-
drawal of guilty pleas, courts place great emphasis on presence or absence of counsel.
See United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Crowe v. United States,
175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721 (D.
N.H. 1952).
13. FED. R. CRam. P. 10. The rule concerns arraignment, and failure to comply with
it will not require reversal on appeal unless shown to be prejudicial. Garland v. Wash-
ington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914). It is sufficient to show a copy of the indictment to defen-
dant's counsel. United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721 (D.N.H. 1952). And the
requirement is waived when the indictment is read to defendant in open court. Ray v.
United States, 192 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1951).
14. For text of FED. R. Crm. P. 11, see note 7 4upra. Rule 11 has been interpreted
to require no specific procedure on the part of the judge, but that he be satisfied under
the circumstances that the accused understands the charge. United States v. Davis, 212
F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Taylor v. United States, 182 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. dcnied,
339 U.S. 988 (1950) ; Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Mayes
v. United States, 177 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp.
721 (D.N.H.'1952).
Accused's lack of counsel or other circumstance may impose on the judge a special
duty to inquire into accused's understanding of the charge. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708 (1947) ; Ruebush v. United States, 206 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Collins v.
United States, 176 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1950) ; United
States v. Snell, 174 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1949).
[Vol, 64
NOTES
When an accused has pleaded guilty without benefit of one of these safe-
guards, he will more easily sustain the burden of demonstrating that the plea
should not stand.15 But other circumstances may show that the defendant
entered the plea freely and understandingly despite the procedural defect.10
And even though ordinary procedural requirements have been met, the de-
fendant will be permitted to withdraw his plea if he can demonstrate that,
notwithstanding these precautions, he was coerced or did not comprehend
significant elements of the charge.17 In Bergen v. United States,18 a guilty
plea made to a charge of conspiracy to defraud was accompanied by accused's
written statement of his "moral" innocence.' 0 The Sixth Circuit, reversing
the trial judge, allowed withdrawal. The court believed that the defendant's state-
ment showed he did not understand the element of intent necessary for con-
spiracy; rather he thought he was guilty simply because he had done the overt
acts charged.2 0 However, where the standard procedural precautions have been
taken, courts are reluctant to grant withdrawal motions which allege com-
pulsion or lack of comprehension, 21 and only compelling evidence wvill release
the defendant from his plea .2 2
The soundness of these judicial rules seems fairly evident. The importance
of procedural measures in protecting the defendant from making an involun-
15. See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (habeas corpus granted: lack
of counsel and no explanation of consequences of plea) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471 (1945) (habeas corpus granted: lack of counsel before plea); Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942) (conviction invalid if induced by FBI agent's threats); United
States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954) (no explanation of charge; remand for
hearing on question of understanding); Gannon v. United States, 203 F.2d 772 (6th
Cir. 1953) (withdrawal allowed: no explanation of consequences and lack of counsel);
Bergen v. United States, 145 F2d 181, 187 (8th Cir. 1944) (dictum).
16. Ray v. United States, 192 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1951) (indictment read to defen-
dant) ; Taylor v. United States, 182 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988
(1950) (accused acquiesced in lawyer's entrance of plea) ; United States v. Searle, 180
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1950) (from general knowledge, accused presumed to know possible
punishment) ; United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264, 271 (7th Cir. 1954) (dissenting
opinion) (accused heard court talking to counsel and prosecutor about counts pleaded
to).
17. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (despite proper proceedings, habeas
corpus will be granted if plea is coerced) ; Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d 181 (8th
Cir. 1944) (written statement showed misapprehension of charge; withdrawal granted).
See also state court withdrawal decisions, e.g., Beard v. State, 227 Ind. 717, 88 N.E.2d
769 (1949) (fear of mob induced plea); State v. Maresca, 85 Conn. 509, 83 AtL 635
(1912) (seeming understanding but poor knowledge of English).
18. 145 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1944).
19. Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d 181, 183, 186 (8th Cir. 1944).
20. Id. at 188.
21. See Taylor v. United States, 182 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 998
(1950); Collins v. United States, 176 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. doecd, 338 U.S.
943 (1950); United States v. Mfignogna, 157 F2d 839 (2d Cir. 1946), ccrt. doicd, 330
U.S. 830 (1947) ; United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721 (D.N.H. 1952) ; cf. Godish
v. United States, 182 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1950).
22. See cases cited note 17 sutpra.
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tary or uniformed plea cannot be gainsaid ;23 and if absence of any such safe-
guard caused entry of a plea, withdrawal is justified. On the other hand,
where these procedures are faithfully followed, the probability that the de-
fendant has understandingly and freely entered the plea seems great enough
to warrant making him offer more persuasive evidence than his mere asser-
tions of ignorance of the charge.
Policy becomes less clear and courts seriously disagree when the issue
is the proper disposition of withdrawal motions alleging mistake as to
the consequences of conviction by the guilty plea.24 Such mistake may proceed
from a defendant's ignorance of the legal penalties prescribed for the crime
with which he is charged.25 But the usual cause is a misleading statement by
the prosecutor 2 6 or other law enforcement officer 27 or by the accused's coun-
sel.2
8
Often the prosecutor and the accused make a plea bargain-an agreement
by which the defendant pleads guilty in return for concessions promised by
the prosecutor.29 Usually the prosecutor dismisses or does not bring a charge
carrying a heavier punishment than the charge to which the accused has pleaded
guilty.30 Or he may assure the defendant that he will receive a light sentence
or probation.3' The accused's mistake as to the consequences of his plea may
23. For judicial statements emphasizing the importance of such procedural safe-
guards, see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1947); Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471, 475 (1945) ; Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 23 (1927); United
States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1954). See 32 J. CRuM. LAw 199 (1941).
24. See, generally, 32 J. Caim. LAw 199, 202 (1941) ; Note, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 484,
487 (1931).
25. Gannon v. United States, 208 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1953).
26. See United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666
(1942) ; Ward v. United States, 1.16 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); Camarota v. United
States, 2 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1924).
27. See United States v. Lias, 173 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1949) (misleading statement
by judge).
28. See United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct.
46 (1954) ; Ridgeway v. United States, 205 F.2d 680 (6th Cir. 1953) ; United States v.
Shneer, 105 F. Supp. 883, aff'd, 194 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1952).
29. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL, 297 (1947); Purr-
KAM'rMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 171. (1953); Baker, The Prosecutor-
Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CraM. LAW 770, 786-92 (1933) ; Baker, The Prosecuting
Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Office, 26 J. CrM. LAw 647, 671-72 (1936); Dash,
Cracks in. the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 393-405 (1951):
Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRIM. LAW 506 (1942); U.S. NA-
TIONAL COMIMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPoRT ON CRIMINAl.
PROCEDURE 3-4 (1931); U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 95-97 (1931.).
30. See PUTTKAMMER, op. cit. supra note 29, at 171; U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 95-96 (1931) ; Dash,
supra note 29, at 392-98; Moley, The Use of the Information in Crintinal Cases, 17
A.B.A.J. 292, 293 (1931).
The practice is often termed "the lesser plea" or "plea to the lesser offense." Some-




arise when the court disregards the agreement 32 or the prosecutor does not
carry out his promise.33
Motions for withdrawal are frequently based upon allegations describing a
dishonored plea bargain.34 If the prosecutor denies having made any agreement,
the court will generally decide that the allegation has not been proved.3
Even when the bargain is shown, some courts deny withdrawal, apparently
on the theory that the defendant should have known that the court would
not be bound by the prosecutor's promise.30 Some of these decisions have
been appealed and affirmed.3 7  However, other courts permit withdrawal,
finding that the plea was entered under mistake.3 8 Appellate courts have also
approved this position,39 and some trial courts which have not adopted it
have been reversed.40 The decisions allowing withdrawal recognize that de-
fendants generally believe that a plea bargain will be implemented by both prose-
cutor and court.4 '
31. See Baker, The Prosecutor-Init iation of Prosecution, 23 J. Cani. LAw 770, 786
(1933); Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Oee, 26 J. C=ni.
LAw 647, 671-72 (1936); U.S. NATioNAL COmmiSSIoN ON LAw ORsEav NCcu E.-
FORCEMENT, REPORT ox PRosEcuON 96 (1931).
32. See United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum) ; United
States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 656 (1942); Ward v.
United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); Camarota v. United States, 2 F2d 650
(3d Cir. 1924).
33. See allegations in Sullivan v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 182, 185 (1954) ; United
States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Ziebart v. United States, 185 F2d
124, 125 (5th Cir. 1950).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951); United States
v. Lias, 173 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1949); Rosensweig v. United States, 144 F.2d 30 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 764 (1944).
35. See Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1948); Rosensweig v.
United States, supra note 34; but see United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.
1.951) (withdrawal under 32(d) denied on other grounds but hearing required under
§ 2255 to determine question of prosecutor's alleged inducement). However, even with-
out prosecutor's denial, court may disbelieve unsupported allegations of prisoner. Am-
mons v. King, 136 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945).
36. See United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666
(1942); Ward v. United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); Camarota v. United
States, 2 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1924); cf. United States v. Domroe, 129 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1942).
37. United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666 (1942);
cf. Camarota v. United States, 2 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1924) (but lower court reversed on
other grounds). See 32 J. Canr. LAw 199, 20 (1941).
38. United States v. Lias, 173 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1949).
39. Ibid.
40. Ward v. United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); cf. Ziebart v. United
States, 185 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Rossi, 39 F.2d 432 (9th Cr.
1930) semble.
41. See United States v. Lias, 173 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Ward v. United States,
116 F2d 135 (6th Cir. 1949); see also 32 J. CRim. LAw 199, 200 (1941). It is un-
reasonable to assume that defendants are aware of the separate legal powers of prose-
cutor and judge.
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When the mistake alleged is caused by statements of the accused's own coun-
sel, trial courts do not usually allow withdrawal. 42 Where the attorney did
not categorically tell the defendant what his punishment would be, these hold-
ings are uniformly affirmed. Appellate courts in such cases characterize the
lawyer's statements as mere predictions or opinions ;43 consequently, mistake
could not have caused the defendant to enter the plea, since he is presumed
to have known that he might receive the maximum punishment. A conflict
has arisen, however, in the few cases where the accused has relied on definite
statements of his counsel.4 4 Two circuit court decisions affirmed denial of
withdrawal in such a situation.45 But the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
enunciated a different rule in United States v. Shneer.40 While affirming
denial of a withdrawal motion, the court suggested that the district court re-
view the evidence to determine whether the attorney had conclusively stated
to the defendant that he would not go to jail if he abandoned his not guilty
plea. 47 With this as a guide, the district court took further evidence, found
definite statements, and permitted withdrawal.
48
The defendant will generally be unable to prove an allegation of mistake
which is not based upon a dishonored plea bargain or a definite and mislead-
ing statement of counsel.49 However, unusual circumstances may exist which
will enable him to establish the mistake. A change of plea will then probably
be permitted. In Gannon v. United States,0 the defendant pleaded guilty to
possessing narcotics. The language of his plea indicated that he expected to
be committed to the Federal Narcotics Farm,"' where he had been sent after
42. See United States v. Goo, 10 F.R.D. 332 (D. Hawaii 1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 62
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341. U.S. 916 (1951) ; United States v. Sehon Chinn, 74 F. Supp.
189 (S.D.W. Va. 1947), aff'd, 163 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1947); but see United States v.
Shneer, 105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 194 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1952).
43. See Futterman v. United States, 202 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; United
States v. Searle, 180 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Weese, 145 F.2d 135,
136 (2d Cir. 1944).
44. For discussion of what is a "definite" statement, see United States v. Shneer,
194 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1952); see also United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 46 (1954); Futterman v. United States, 202 F.2d
185, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
45. United States v. Parrino, suqpra note 44 (counsel said conviction would not be
basis for deportation) ; Ridgeway v. United States, 205 F.2d 680 (6th Cir. 1953) (coun-
sel said sentence would be probation); contra, United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264
(7th Cir. 1954).
46. 194 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1952).
47. United States v. Shneer, 194 F.2d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 1952).
48. United States v. Shneer, 105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
49. See, e.g., denial of motions in United States v. Panebianco, 208 F.2d 238 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954) ; Futterman v. United States, 202 F.2d 185
(D.C. Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Searle, 180 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1950) ; United States
v. Denniston, 89 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 709 (1937).
50. 208 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1953).
51. Gannon v. United States, 208 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1953).
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a prior conviction for the same crime.52 Although he was again sentenced to
the Farm, another information was brought, charging him with being a second
offender. 53 After conviction on this information, Gannon moved to vacate
that judgment, stating that he wished to withdraw the guilty plea which had
made him a second offender.5 4 The district court denied withdrawal,*5 but tile
Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the court had not explained the
second offender penalties to Gannon and that he had not properly vaived hit
right to counsel.5 6 Mistake was clearly shown, but by circumstances rare in
the federal courts.
A new restriction upon withdrawal has been established by the Second
Circuit in Parrino v. United States.57 There the defendant entered a plea of
guilty to a charge of conspiracy to kidnap,58 relying upon his counsel's state-
ment that conviction could not be the basis for deportation proceedings. 0
When such proceedings were begun, Parrino moved to withdraw his plea.cO
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the motion.61
One ground for its holding was that mistake as to deportation did not re-
quire the trial court to allow withdrawal, since deportation was simply a
"'collateral consequence" of conviction. 2 Apparently the court regards as
"collateral" all consequences other than sentence and punishment in the par-
ticular case.63 In contrast, the Gannon decision directed the district court to
permit withdrawal where the defendant was ignorant of second offender
penalties which were to be imposed in a subsequent proceeding."
Perplexing policy conflicts must be resolved by a court in passing on with-
drawal motions alleging mistake as to consequences. Finality of judicial pro-
cedures is a basic consideration opposed to withdrawal. 05 Nevertheless, it is
52. Ibid.
53. Id. at 773.
54. Ibid.
55. Id. at 772.
56. Id. at 774.
57. 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 46 (1954).
5& Parrino v. United States, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denicd, 75 Sup. Ct. 46
(1954).
59. Id. at 921, 923 n.6.
60. Id. at 921.
61. Id. at 922. Frank, J. dissented with opinion. Ibid.
62. Id. at 921-22. The alternate ground was that the defendant's mistake had been
caused by his counsel's statements, and hence could not justify withdraw-al. See text at
notes 44-45 supra.
63. Id. at 922. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950), for a list of consequences of
conviction. See also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954); and state-
ment of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Parrino, 203 F.2d 234, 285 (2d Cir.
1953): "followed by deportation, a consequence that under the circumstances will be
substantially the equivalent of adding the punishment of exile to that prescribed by the
statute!'
64. See text at notes 50-56 supra.
65. See United States v. Parrino, 212 F2d 919, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 75 Sup.
Ct 46 (1954). See also Rogge & Gordon, Habeas Corpus, Civil Rights, and the Federal
System, 20 U. CH. L. REv. 509 (1933) ; 32 J. Cxnn LAw 199, 202 (1941).
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clear that withdrawal should be permitted where the accused has pleaded in
reliance on untrue representations of the prosecutor.0 0 An innocent person
may enter into a plea bargain, believing that he would be convicted anyway
and might receive a substantially greater penalty. 7 When the anticipated
benefit is withheld, it is manifest injustice not to allow withdrawal. And
withdrawal cannot be restricted to defendants whom the judge believes inno-
cent, since courts may not pass on the question of guilt in applying procedural
remedies.08 Additional support for withdrawal can be found in the desira-
bility of maintaining the efficacy of plea bargaining as a tool in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice. 9 Prosecutors work within limited budgets, and
plea bargaining appears necessary to enable them to dispose of the many cases
which arise.7" An accused criminal will be reluctant to enter into a plea bar-
gain if he cannot withdraw his guilty plea when the expected result of the
bargain is not forthcoming. 71
66. See Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Office, 26 J. Ciumt.
LAW 647, 672 (1936); 26 J. Cram. LAW 457, 458 (1936); 32 J. Cmt. LAW 199, 202
(1941).
The following rule is laid down in Rachel v. United States, 61 F.2d 360, 362 (8th
Cir. 1932): The appellant must show "that the plea of guilty should not be allowed to
stand against him because of some reason existing when it was entered, but for which
he would not have entered the plea, and that reason must amount to a fraud or an im-
position upon him, or a misapprehension of his legal right."
67. See BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 112, 367 (1932): the cases of John
A. Johnson (fear of mob violence induced plea from innocent man) and of James Willis
(with strong case against him, innocent accused pleaded guilty in hope of leniency);
Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 392-95, 401
(1951); Oppenheim, Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 25 Mica. L. REV. 695,
716-17 (1927) ; Notes, 50 YALE L.J. 499, 504-06 (1941) ; 28 YALE L.J. 168, 170 (1918);
64 HARV. L. REV. 1376, 1377-78 (1951).
68. See note 6 supra. See United States v. Claudy, 204 F.2d 624, 627 (3d Cir. 1953);
EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1952).
See also dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 82 (1950): "By the Bill of Rights the founders of this country subordinated police
action to legal restraints, not in order to convenience the guilty but to protect the inno-
cent. Nor did they provide that only the innocent may appeal to these safeguards."
69. For advantages and drawbacks of the prosecutor's discretion to bargain, see
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 299-300 (1947); PUTMKAMMEU,
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL. LAW 171 (1953); Baker, The Prosecutor-lnsiiation of
Prosecution, 23 J. CRiam. LAW 770, 786-87 (1933); Moley, The Use of the Information
in Criminal Cases, 17 A.B.A.J. 292, 293 (1931); Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas
Considered, 32 J. CRim. LAW 506, 529 (1941) ; 32 J. CRIM. LAW 199, 202 (1941) ; and
for a vehement attack on the practice in Chicago, see Dash, Cracks in the Foundatin
of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 392-405 (1951).
70. ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 69, at 299; Baker, supra note 69, at 791; Weintraub
& Tough, supra note 69, at 529; U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVAN E AN2D
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 96-97 (1931).
71. See Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Office, 26 J. Cm t.
LAW 647, 673 (1936) ; 32 J. CGUM. LAw 199, 202 (1941). For a recent discussion of
withdrawal in England, see 117 JusT. P. 620 (1953).
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5NOTES
Even where no plea bargain is involved, a defendant who is able to estab-
lish that his plea was entered because of mistake as to consequences should
be allowed withdrawal. 72 Although such change of plea cannot be supported
by the administrative policy favoring plea bargains, there still exists the pos-
sibility of a guilty plea being entered by an innocent person relying on the
security of a known outcome.73 This possibility is present whether the mis-
take concerns "collateral" or "direct" consequences. When the accused can
prove that his counsel made conclusive statements to him about material con-
sequences, it is reasonable to infer that these assertions were the cause of
the plea.74 Hence, if it develops that the lawyer was wrong, withdrawal
should be allowed. When the defendant cannot introduce this type of evi-
dence, he will generally be unable to sustain his burden of proof." However,
if he presents other compelling evidence establishing mistake, as the accused did
in the Gannon case, 6 he should be permitted to change his plea. In a society
where protection of the innocent individual is deemed more important than
efficiency in gaining convictions, courts must be willing to permit defendants
who have pleaded guilty under clear mistake to have a trial on the merits.
72. See 32 J. Ca-m. LAw 199 (1941).
73. See Oppenheim, supra note 67, at 716-17; Notes, 28 YALE Lj. 168, 170 (1918);
64 HARv. L. REv. 1376, 1377 (1951); 28 IND. L.J. 374, 377-82 (1953).
74. Weintraub & Tough, supra note 69, at 529: "The average defendant will not
plead guilty unless he feels that he is getting the better of what under any circum-
stances must be for him a bad bargain." See also United States Y. Parrino, 212 F2d
919, 921, 923 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 46 (1954); United States v. Par-
rino, 203 F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir. 1953) : "Parrino declared that he understood the charge
and would plead 'on one condition,' which, however, he withdrew after he had talked
with his attorney who was in court."
75. See cases cited note 49 supra.
76. See text at notes 50-56 mipra.
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